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Abstract
As cyberattacks on city and public infrastructures
become increasingly common and harmful, it is
critical that we train the professional workforce to
prepare and respond appropriately.
This paper
supports the development of educational simulations
and related experiential learning exercises that help
prepare city and public infrastructure personnel to
effectively respond to cybersecurity attacks. Specifically,
it synthesizes the findings from 8 expert interviews
including 12 cybersecurity experts from federal, state,
city organizations, as well as academics with relevant
expertise. We organize the findings into key learning
outcomes, scenarios, roles, and issues that simulation
designers should consider. The result paints a vivid
picture of the complex socio-technical context of city and
public infrastructure attacks and responses and the most
salient skills needed to respond to them.

1.

Introduction

In this age of information, the hostages are not only
people. In 2019, a ransomware attack in Baltimore
demanded upwards of $76,000 USD to decrypt city
data. The attack disrupted municipal systems to the
point that the mayor proposed that employees clean city
streets in lieu of office work [1]. Atlanta lost over $17
million recovering from a ransomware attack in 2018,
which affected law enforcement and most other city
services. Police officers wrote incident reports by hand
when they were unable to access archived in-vehicle
video [2]. Other cities, such as Kiev, have borne the
brunt of cyberattacks that shut off the power grid and
affected industrial control systems (ICSs) [3]. These
attacks demonstrate the critical need to train city and
public infrastructure professionals to prevent, prepare
for, and respond to cyberattacks on cities and their
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public infrastructures. Indeed, most local governments
report being less than confident in their ability to prevent
similar breaches [4, 5].
Protecting a city against cybersecurity attacks is
becoming more difficult. Unlike companies, city-wide
infrastructure systems feature a fragile combination of
heterogeneous systems with multiple stakeholders like
government (local, state, federal) and private entities,
and intertwined dependencies between them [6]. Due to
these complex interdependencies, even a small localized
attack can bring on a cascading series of failures that can
compromise the city functions, and in some cases, even
cost human lives. With the move towards smart cities
and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the challenge to
defend against cyberattacks is even higher [7, 8].
Unfortunately, learning how to coordinate
effectively and respond appropriately in such a
complex, collaborative, and high-pressure situation is
hard to do without actually experiencing the scenario.
Since these scenarios are so infrequent and damaging,
learning from experience alone is not a viable solution.
This is one reason why educational simulations and
experiential learning opportunities have grown in
popularity among cybersecurity educators [9].
The goal of this paper is to support the development
of educational simulations and related experiential
learning exercises (e.g., games, tabletop experiences,
competitions) that help prepare city and public
infrastructure personnel to effectively respond to
cyberattacks. Specifically, we synthesize the findings
from expert interviews to identify key learning
outcomes, scenarios, roles, and issues that simulation
designers should consider. This work was conducted
as background research for our own efforts to develop
a city-wide cyberattack incident response simulation.
However, we believe the insights we synthesize
from expert interviews can inform different types of
simulations and educational interventions.
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2.

Background

Cities and their critical infrastructures have become
a major target of cyberattacks in recent years. These
targeted cities have experienced data loss, theft, and
other interruptions to normal operations, often spending
millions on recovery efforts. Some attacks on cities
and their infrastructures have been performed by nation
states, such as the cyberattacks by Russian hackers in
2015 that shut off Ukraine’s power grid [3, 10]. In
recent years, international criminal gangs have used
ransomware to make computing resources unavailable
unless a significant bitcoin payment is made. The
city of Atlanta was hit hard by ransomware in 2018.
Fortunately, they recovered quickly because of the
counter-strategy and manual operations they had in
place which allowed them to keep water and emergency
systems online during the attack [2]. Denver’s Colorado
Department of Transportation (CDoT) network was
maliciously encrypted with malware when an unsecured
web server was connected briefly to their network in
2018 [11]. They cleared their systems and restored
backups, but failed to eradicate tools the hackers left
behind, thus leaving their systems exposed. Baltimore’s
systems were exploited in 2019, resulting in a loss
of critical city governance information where external
backups were not in place. Billing, payments, and other
transactions were frozen, incurring a loss of over $18
million in revenue and systems [12]. Attacks on cities
are increasing in damage and frequency, highlighting
the importance of countermeasures, backups, and
cybersecurity training. Indeed, many municipalities are
purchasing insurance to mitigate the potential damages
incurred by such attacks [13].
Attacks on city and public infrastructures are
particularly damaging. Many everyday activities that
affect citizens’ lives can be disrupted when public
systems such as power, water, and transportation are
affected. For example, cyberattacks that have led to
physical damages include tram derailments in Poland
(2008) [14] and the disruption of German steel mill
operations (2014) [15], among others. Furthermore,
municipalities maintain records with high levels of
personally identifiable information (PII) that is a prime
target for cybercriminals, including unique identifiers
like driver’s licence numbers. Successful attacks on
such data lead to data exfiltration and theft, as well as
embarrassment of individuals.
Securing city and public infrastructure is
an extremely challenging job.
City and public
infrastructures host and integrate a variety of different
devices, systems, and configurations ranging from
standard IT systems to Industrial Control Systems

(ICSs) including Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems that control physical
equipment. Securing such disparate devices requires
a wide range of expertise and coordination, as well
as a good understanding of the interdependencies of
different sub-systems. Another significant challenge
is dealing with obsolete equipment such as outdated
operating systems that are still needed to run legacy
software that connects to ICSs [16]. City and public
infrastructures are distributed among many stakeholders
(e.g., city government, utilities, hospitals), with the
need to provide security and integration across a range
of organizations. Furthermore, general training in
cybersecurity is often limited or non-existent [17].
Hiring personnel dedicated to cybersecurity can require
taking funds from somewhere else, or raising taxes,
both of which are less-than-ideal situations. Because
training is also cut when local governments run low
on funds [4], cybersecurity duties are often added to
existing job responsibilities of IT staff, many of whom
do not have sufficient training [18].
We need to prepare those who may work with
city and public infrastructures to understand both the
city environment and the cybersecurity risks associated
with it. This is not only a technical problem, but
a socio-technical one [19]. Almost 35% of security
incidents are caused by human errors and negligence
[20]. The Global State of Information Security Survey
2018 attributes 30% of security incidents as caused by
current employees of organizations [21]. Often, those in
non-technical roles unintentionally disclose information
or allow physical breaches (e.g., lost, discarded, or
stolen paper documents), which can lead to bigger
threats [22]. Although there is a widespread mindset
that cybersecurity is a responsibility of IT personnel
rather than general employees [20], the problem is
inherently collaborative – it cannot be solved by a
single person or role. A functioning city consists of
close-knit relationships between multiple government
organizations and private entities working together
[23]. Yet, 47% of IT professionals perceive a lack of
collaboration between cybersecurity risk management
roles and general organizational roles [20]. To ensure
that coordinated response actions can be taken in the
face of cyberattacks, it is essential that cybersecurity
education stresses people’s dependence on one another.
A variety of experiential learning activities have
been used to help train cybersecurity students and
professionals.
For example, learners often work
individually or in teams on cybersecurity competitions
[24], simulations [25], games [26], tabletop exercises
[27], and playable case studies [28]. These hands-on
experiences allow learners to experience the stress of
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high-pressure, complex situations, while also providing
a safe place for them to fail [29].
National
CCDC and Cyberpatriot, two prominent cybersecurity
competitions, allow teams of university and high school
students, respectively, to test their defensive skills
by protecting a small network from external threats.
Anchored instruction suggests that interesting problems
and engaging scenarios can form an “anchor” or context
for students to use when trying to learn new skills and
dispositions [30]. Consequently, simulations and related
experiential learning activities have become an essential
part of the fabric of cybersecurity education. Most
of these experiences focus primarily on the technical
aspects of cybersecurity, although there is recognition
by the community that creating learning experiences that
are more holistic and focused on social and cognitive
aspects is important [25].
Researchers and educators have begun to explore
and develop simulations that focus specifically on city
and infrastructure cyberattacks. Frey et al. developed
a LEGO based collaborative tabletop game about
security in ICSs and human behavior in cybersecurity
decision-making [31], with future plans to create a
digital version. Play2Prepare, a board game for ICS
security training with an objective to increase security
awareness and encourage discussions during a security
incident, also realized the need for a digital version
to promote better team collaboration [32]. Another
training program for municipalities is the tabletop
exercise called a Jack Voltaic exercise that comprises
different “Cyber Worst Day” scenarios to examine
critical infrastructure interdependencies and encourage
cross-sector information sharing. It also consists of
a “Live-Fire Exercise” where cybersecurity equipment
is capability tested in real time [33]. Additionally,
classes that involve live, interactive simulations using
real-world ICSs have been run at Idaho National Labs
with professionals for years [34].
In addition to the explicitly educational simulations
outlined above, developers have created test beds
for ICSs (e.g., KYPO4INDUSTRY) that allow them
to model the technical aspects of cyber-physical
systems [35]. Most of these existing tools are either
attack-specific or infrastructure-specific. Separate from
particular types of attacks or scenarios, there have also
been efforts to holistically consider interdependencies
between critical city infrastructures [36], such as
CIPMA, IIM, and NSRAM. CIPMA was designed as a
decision-support system for the Australian Government
to simulate complex interdependencies between critical
infrastructure systems [37]. IIM is a computer-based
simulation capable of simulating cascading effects
of terrorist attacks on economic interdependencies

[37]. The NSRAM is a network simulation tool that
accurately considers the severity of network failures and
repair variables (like time to repair, cost to replace, etc)
[37]. While these systems currently serve operational
purposes, they may one-day serve as a foundation for
educational simulations.
Our hope is that a variety of new experiential
learning interventions (e.g., simulations, games) will
be developed that focus on protecting city and public
infrastructure. This paper helps designers build upon
a solid foundation of research-based learning outcomes
and consider unique contextual factors.

3.

Methods

To better understand potential learning outcomes,
municipal cybersecurity attack scenarios, and other
considerations for simulation designers and educators,
we held interviews with a diverse group of 12 content
experts between August and November of 2019.
Our participants are established industry professionals
and trainers focused on municipal cybersecurity
from federal agencies and national labs, Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERT), municipalities,
and corporations, as well as university professors with
a background in cybersecurity and disaster response.
Most interviewees have decades of experience in dealing
with cybersecurity and have experienced or designed
educational materials and/or simulations and tabletop
exercises. This allowed them to provide expert advice
on both the everyday experiences of those dealing with
cyberattacks on city and public infrastructure, and the
pedagogical issues of designing simulations. An ID
for each interview (e.g., I-1) and a description of the
attendees are included in Table 1. We refer to our
interviews by number (e.g., I-1) to maintain anonymity.
Our immediate goal was to develop a realistic
storyline and integrated learning activities for a new
Playable Case Study (PCS) [38, 39] focused on a
municipal cyberattack. However, we also saw this
as an opportunity to ask questions broader than
our project alone, so the findings could be shared
with other simulation designers and educators. We
performed semi-structured interviews [40], following
an interview protocol that included broad questions
about several topics including plausible cyberattack
scenarios (e.g., types of attacks on cities), common
work tasks (e.g., risk assessment strategies, processes
for responding to cyberattacks), the people and roles
involved in the work, key learning outcomes for
junior cybersecurity professionals, helpful resources for
novices, and concerns the experts had regarding future
threats and vulnerabilities. We also explained our goal
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of developing a municipal cyberattack simulation, so
interviewees could share advice and thoughts that would
be useful for that context. All but two interviews
were audio recorded and transcribed: these sessions
were not recorded at the interviewees’ request, but
extensive notes were taken by multiple team members
and integrated. Members of the team took detailed field
notes during each interview session, then expanded upon
these notes with first-round glosses of available audio
recordings and qualitatively-coded interview transcripts.
We performed a thematic analysis [41] on the
transcripts and field notes to identify themes in two
key areas: learning outcomes and simulation design
considerations. Four authors coded data. It began
with two coders independently coding each interview
transcript and set of notes, extracting important ideas
and quotes that related to cyberattack simulations within
each of the two key areas. Next, we did a second
round to refine the coding scheme and consolidate coded
passages across the two coders. We then discussed the
resulting codes (and the quotes associated with them)
and collaboratively and iteratively grouped them into the
high-level themes presented in the paper. Themes were
not determined a priori, but rather emerged through our
analysis of the data.

4.
4.1.

Results
Learning Outcomes

This section synthesizes the comments that experts
provided about the most important knowledge,
skills, and dispositions needed by those dealing with
cyberattacks on municipalities. Table 2 summarizes
the emergent themes and specific learning outcomes
associated with each theme. The paragraphs that follow
describe each theme, helping to tie them back to the
specific comments made by interviewees.

4.1.1. Resourcefulness.
Eight experts mentioned
resourcefulness as one of the traits of a good
cybersecurity professional. They spoke about how
cybersecurity professionals should be able to acquire
information from various sources and synthesize it to
make informed recommendations for action. Experts
talked about the importance of troubleshooting and
searching for evidence (I-6), soliciting information
from other departments (I-1), and networking with a
community of peers to discuss recent threats (I-8).

4.1.2. Information Brokering.
Another skill
that eight of our experts agreed was important

Table 1. Interviews Conducted with Experts.

Interview
ID
I-1

I-2
I-3
I-4
I-5
I-6

I-7
I-8

Description
Two cybersecurity trainers; two
CERT content experts affiliated
with a national lab
Professor studying skills/aptitudes
of cybersecurity professionals
Professor & cybersecurity expert in
federal government & industry
Professor with expertise in disaster
response and cybersecurity
Security director for a major US
city
Cybersecurity advisor in federal
government; Information Security
professional in industry
Emergency management lead in
state government
Professor in CS with industry
DNS/network security expertise

for cybersecurity professionals was an ability to
communicate information to different audiences.
One expert described that sometimes cybersecurity
professionals are “not very good at communicating
without being so in the weeds that nobody understands
what they’re doing” (I-5).
I-6 described that
cybersecurity professionals need to be comfortable
with reporting on an event to company leadership. In
addition to communication within one’s organization,
the expert in I-4 stated that communicating to the public
is “a very pivotal role to any sort of crisis or disaster.”
Another interviewee emphasized what he considered
“one of the big things in any incident, whether it’s
cyber or shooting or whatever, is communication
of what’s happened and what’s being done. Those
are all internal immediate communications” (I-7).
This quote underscores how information brokering
activities often occur in potentially stressful, real-time
situations. Finally, several interviewees emphasized
the importance of debrief reports and incident response
plans, suggesting that writing clearly and using
well-established cybersecurity report genres is an
important part of information brokering.

4.1.3. Emotional Intelligence.
Several traits that
our experts (six) put forth as being the most important
for cybersecurity professionals fell under the category
of emotional intelligence. Our experts stated that those
working in cybersecurity need to be patient during the
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Table 2. Learning Outcomes for Professionals Dealing with Municipal Cybersecurity Attacks.

Theme

Learning Outcome

Resourcefulness

Acquire information, synthesize information from various sources, and make
informed recommendations for action.

Information Brokering

Act as an information broker by translating and presenting technical concepts to
non-technical audiences to bridge the gap between stakeholders (IT personnel,
non-IT personnel, general public).

Emotional Intelligence

Develop patience and curiosity essential for stressful cybersecurity scenarios.
Understand how people in different roles think.

Holistic Approach

Assess risk and higher-order effects from multiple perspectives, and build a
comprehensive vision from the various pieces.

Preparation

Understand the importance of preparation, following best practices, prioritizing
important decisions ahead of time, and put in place proactive measures to protect
systems.

Cybersecurity
Awareness

Understand the importance of security awareness at all levels and be aware of
current threats in cybersecurity.

Attack Lifecycle

Understand the major factors of an attack including, detection, mitigation, and
attribution.

Developer Skills

Be able to understand the importance of software development skills in the
security landscape.

Hacker Mindset

Be able to understand the hackers mindset to anticipate what action they will take.

discovery phase (I-1), be “curious” and “motivated to
learn” (I-5), and able to make decisions when “you don’t
necessarily have all the information that you need” (I-4).
Developing patience and curiosity essential for stressful
cybersecurity scenarios is necessary to understand how
people in different roles think and how to work with
them collaboratively.

4.1.4. Holistic Approach.
Six experts stated
that cybersecurity professionals need to have a
broad understanding of the attack. One explained
how cybersecurity professionals need to build
a comprehensive vision from various pieces of
information (I-1). Another shared that “we need to
think about [risk] in multiple dimensions” and that
looking at the many primary and secondary effects
that an attack could have can provide “a richer and
deeper sense of the sophistication of the attack” (I-3).
Several interviewees shared examples of unexpected
consequences of entire systems collapsing because a
seemingly innocuous device goes down. Developing
a ”holistic approach” also means understanding the
consequences of decisions that are made during the
mitigation phase such as “restarting ICS devices,” which
can “cause lots of other problems” (I-1). Learning to
see the forest from the trees and to think ahead about
unintended consequences are key.

4.1.5. Preparation.
Many of the experts (nine)
talked about preparation as being essential to mitigating
the effect of cyberattacks. Cybersecurity professionals
need to be mindful of what proactive measures can
be put in place before an attack happens. One expert
described this need for preparation as the “linchpin”
and emphasized the need to “understand what you’re
up against, and then build the defenses against it” (I-7).
Other experts mentioned ways to prepare for attacks,
including creating a recovery plan for the day after
an attack and keeping regular backups (I-2 and I-5),
patching vulnerabilities and identifying compensating
controls when patches are not possible (I-6), and setting
alerts to trigger when abnormal traffic is detected (I-8).
Others emphasized the importance of having standard
practices in place, such as backups. In the words of I-7,
“[What is] the easiest thing we can do for cybersecurity?
Backup, right. Yeah. Backup backup backup”.

4.1.6. Cybersecurity Awareness.
Two experts
stressed the importance of building cybersecurity
awareness into daily lives to mitigate future attacks.
It is important to understand the role of security
awareness at all levels and be aware of current threats
in cybersecurity. One of the experts pointed out
that although cybersecurity professionals are generally
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aware of threats and can identify them, most general
workers besides these professionals are not adequately
aware of threats (I-7). Another expert emphasized
the importance of being mindful of phishing emails,
describing the consequences of lack of awareness as
“You’re not going to have a hacker break through your
firewall or those kinds of old things that used to happen.
They just send people emails, and bad things happen
after that.” (I-5). For more technical roles, cybersecurity
awareness includes a deeper understanding of what
constitutes an anomaly. For example, I-6 stated that
“You have to know what a baseline of network traffic
looks like so that you can recognize an anomaly”.

4.1.7. Attack Lifecycle.
Understanding the
components of an attack lifecycle such as detection,
mitigation, and attribution is an important learning
outcome for cybersecurity education (six experts). As
per an expert, cybersecurity professionals need to be
able to ”identify weaknesses in the system” and ”hunt
for issues” (I-1). Another interviewee explained that
his “best advice is [to] have a plan that does a risk
analysis that looks at the threats. Your vulnerability to
the threats helps you understand the consequences of
your vulnerabilities to those threats” (I-7). Not only
should they know what is wrong, they should understand
how attacks show up in their systems and be proactive
enough to configure systems to collect data beforehand
that could be used later when diagnosing problems (I-1).
Experts also acknowledged the problem of teaching
attribution due to it being complicated by ”geopolitical
elements” such as sophisticated hackers using botnets to
reflect attacks from around the world (I-8).

4.1.8. Developer Skills. Another learning outcome
that one expert pointed out was the need to understand
the importance of software development skills in the
security landscape. One expert pointed out that having
software development skills provides an upper hand
when it comes to securing systems (I-5). Increases
in an app-centric ecosystem and cloud deployment
are making the network approach of security obsolete.
The same expert mentioned, ”It’s all about application
security. And you need a developer mindset, who also
has the security layer instilled in them. And they’re your
secret weapon, you know, in the new world.”

4.1.9. Hacker Mindset.
In war, thinking like
an opponent is the greatest advantage [42]. This is
true in cybersecurity attacks as well. In interview
sessions, many experts (six) mentioned the importance

of understanding the hacker’s mindset to anticipate what
actions they will take (I-1, I-3, I-8). They emphasized
the importance of thinking from the offensive side so
as to understand hacker actions and motives. One expert
mentioned that the purpose of some attacks “isn’t to take
someone out, but to cover your tracks while you’re doing
something else. (I-8)” Having a hacker mindset is useful
to understand these kinds of distractions and focus on
the real threats.

4.2.

Design Considerations

Experts shared many insights about how to design
cybersecurity attack simulations and related educational
interventions.
Specifically, they offered likely
scenarios, roles that participants might play, and other
recommendations for building effective simulations. We
consider each of these categories in turn.

4.2.1. Scenarios.
The most commonly discussed
type of cyberattack for a scenario was a ransomware
attack as there have been several high-profile cases
concerning municipalities in recent years [1, 13]. It
was suggested (I-1) that a ransomware attack on a
couple of critical infrastructure systems (e.g., power
and water) might allow for a strong narrative since it
is (a) high impact, (b) unknown who is perpetrating
the attack, and (c) an opportunity to go through the
entire discovery and incident response process. I-3 also
noted that a ransomware attack could introduce the idea
of second-order effects and unintended consequences
(e.g., a billing system going down leading to power
outages). Other common types of attacks mentioned
by experts included malware, phishing, and denial of
service attacks. When designing training simulations,
it is important to address plausible scenarios that people
are likely to encounter in real-life. Therefore, designing
simulations around one (or more) of these common
cyberattacks seems to be a promising approach.
When considering high impact scenarios that would
convey the complexity of cyberattacks, many experts
(six) talked about attacks on critical infrastructure. One
expert (I-7) identified electricity, potable water, and
the collection of wastewater as particularly damaging
targets: “the cascading impacts of a disruption to those
critical services can be really meaningful.” Other experts
echoed worries over electrical and water outages, and
further expressed concerns over the potential severity
of attacks targeting transportation, gas, hospital, or
telecommunication systems (I-1, I-6). Additionally, I-7
stated that “You’ve got a lot of small-time operators
running critical infrastructures. . . They’re all wearing
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Table 3. Expert recommendations for designing cybersecurity simulations.

Recommendation

Description

Consider a variety of factors
when planning

Ask questions about the weather, population of affected areas, how long the
problem might last, and what kind of long-term impacts could occur when
planning a scenario.

Provide opportunities to
prepare for an attack

For example, give participants funds to allocate for cybersecurity
improvements at the beginning and let those allocations affect the rest of the
simulation.

Use a simple risk model

Don’t overwhelm participants with the complex algorithms used in
professional risk models.

Include experts for
consultation

Let participants ask experts about the attacks they encounter. It creates a
more realistic work space and teaches participants that security roles cannot
be done in isolation.

Add unpredictable elements

Model the unpredictable nature of cyberattacks. Participants should be able
to prevent some attacks, but not everything.

Encourage information
sharing and collaboration

For example, give each participant access to information that others do not
have. Participants must then collaborate and share information in order to
see all sides of the problem.

Capture tension between
roles and characters

For example, give participants conflicting goals (e.g., forensics wants to find
the cause while incident response wants to fix the problem) so they can
better understand the interpersonal challenges of teamwork.

Present contradictory
information

Help participants disentangle and synthesize information based on their
understanding of attribution and make recommendations for action.

Include multiple rounds

Give participants opportunities to demonstrate what they’ve learned by
coming up with solutions across multiple rounds.

Assign a debriefing exercise

Have participants conduct a post analysis on the data and experience, and
write a final report to help solidify what they have learned.

four hats in their small organization. So, they’re
very vulnerable.” Experts noted how an attack on
one of these critical infrastructures could quickly
escalate to affect other systems. Modeling these types
of interdependencies and vulnerabilities is key when
creating a realistic simulation scenario (I-3).
Experts also felt that it would be important to
give participants a scenario where they can experience
the different phases of a cybersecurity response (I-1).
Ideally, participants might start the simulation in
a preparation phase, where they can perform risk
assessments, take steps to address vulnerabilities, and
create incident response plans (I-2, I-3, I-6, I-7). After
this phase, participants would move on to the detection
phase where they would quickly determine (hopefully)
that an attack had occurred and begin the process of
understanding what has happened and the extent of the
security breach (I-1, I-8). Next is the response phase
where participants would identify steps for dealing with
the situation (I1-C1). I-7 discussed the importance of
communicating what is happening and what is being

done during this phase so that the response team can
adequately coordinate their efforts. Another phase
mentioned was identifying who was behind the attack,
which is often called attribution. I-8 emphasized how
this is a complicated issue due to geopolitical elements.
The final mitigation phase would occur at the conclusion
of the simulation. During this phase, participants
would assess and report on their performance during the
simulation (I-1) and determine ways to better prepare
for the next attack (I-1, I-2, I-5). Moving through
these different phases during a simulation would give
participants a more realistic experience.

4.2.2. Roles.
The complexity of city and
public infrastructure attacks inevitably leads to the
involvement of a variety of personnel with different
roles. Experts mentioned several possible roles to
include in simulations, including a “team lead”, an
external liaison, an analyst to monitor interface and
network “choke points” for “unusual behaviors”, and
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an ICS expert who is “completely focused on machines
and equipment” (I-1), as well as incident response and
vulnerability analyst roles (I-2). Interviewees stressed
the importance of introducing these different roles and
how they must coordinate in order to succeed. The
importance of sharing information with others was
particularly salient. Interviewees (five) gave several
examples of cases where people filling different roles
needed to share information with one another in order to
accurately find, characterize, and in some cases attribute
cyberattacks. For example, I-6 mentioned that a person
reviewing firewall logs may not have the background
to fully understand if some requests are abnormal.
They liked the idea of developing simulations wherein
people fill different roles and have access to different
information that must be shared in order to succeed.
Interviewees (nine) also emphasized some of the
tensions that exist based on conflicting incentives that
different roles have. For example, I-1 mentioned the
conflicts that can occur between information technology
(IT) personnel in charge of the computing infrastructure
and operations technology (OT) personnel in charge
of ICSs. They mentioned how IT and OT personnel
do not think in the same way and often OT personnel
do not think about security. They recommended
building a simulation that could bring this tension to
the forefront by having fictional IT & OT characters at
an organization that was attacked not get along or have
some misunderstanding. Another issue interviewees
raised was the tension between incident responders who
are trying to immediately stop things from causing
damage and forensic experts interested in capturing data
to identify how people got in and who is behind it.
Interviewees (four) also emphasized how common
it is for multiple institutions to get involved after a
significant attack. I-6 recommended that simulation
designers: “Do something big that includes different
agencies. Then you’ll have a real scenario.” These
include different local agencies (e.g., utility companies,
city and county government institutions), state and
federal agencies (e.g., DHS, FBI, CERT experts) who
often support local staff with less experience after
significant attacks, and formal and informal professional
cybersecurity networks. Modeling the sociotechnical
side, and not just the technical issues, was particularly
important to many of our interviewees. For example, I-8
mentioned the need to consult with other cybersecurity
experts, not just documentation: “I cannot stress enough
that the community is a big deal. So I’m on a few
mailing lists where I’ll see people, hey, I’m seeing this
type of traffic. Has anyone else seen this? And then
some will say, yeah, we started seeing this Tuesday at
5am and a no. So yeah, sometimes you don’t know what

to get out of isolation [until you] taste things together.
And you hear from other operators and what they’re
seeing across the internet.”

4.2.3. Simulation Recommendations. Many of the
experts had either designed cybersecurity simulations
or participated in simulations and they offered several
specific recommendations (not already covered) for
making them more realistic and effective. These
recommendations are summarized in Table 3.

5.

Discussion

As cyberattacks on city and public infrastructure
become increasingly common and harmful, it is critical
that we train the professional workforce to prepare
and respond appropriately. This is a challenging
task, given the complexity of such attacks that often
include multiple institutions at the local, state, and
federal level; different technical and non-technical roles;
and a variety of different information technologies
and ICSs. Based on 8 interviews of 12 diverse
cybersecurity experts, many of whom have dealt directly
with city and public infrastructure attacks, we have
identified learning outcomes and suggestions for those
designing simulations and other experiential learning
interventions.
Over the past year, our research team has been
designing and building a PCS [38, 39] called MIRROR
(Municipal Incident Response and Risk Operations
Range) focused on a cyber-physical attack on a fictional
city and its public infrastructure. Of necessity, we
have only been able to take on a handful of the key
learning outcomes and design considerations outlined
in this paper. The insights provided by our expert
interviews have inspired our focus on a role-based,
collaborative simulation that introduces several key
aspects of the attack lifecycle within the context of a
realistic ransomware and malware scenario. Below is a
brief discussion of how the information in this paper has
helped us design the MIRROR playable case study.
Teams of learners will join together into groups of 4
members, each of whom will take on the role of a system
administrator, SCADA technician, security operations
center analyst, or a communications manager. They will
interact with fictional characters, such as the CISO of
Bronze Falls (the fictional city) and content experts who
provide educational scaffolding and tasks. The goal is to
introduce them to the entire attack lifecycle, including
three major phases of planning, incident response,
and attribution, each of which includes a collaborative
activity. For example, in the “planning” phase, the team
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must collaboratively decide what security controls to
invest in. To help make these decisions, each player
is given information specific to their role and advice
from a fictional supervisor in their own organizational
unit about what controls are important. They are also
introduced to risk assessment calculations and given
a “breach report” with data on prior attacks on city
and public infrastructures. Because they each receive
role-specific, potentially conflicting information, the
importance of information brokering is underscored,
as is an understanding that different information is
available to people in different roles.
During the “incident response phase” players must
respond to a ransomware attack that is spreading
through the city’s IT department devices, as well as
a malware attack affecting SCADA devices. Again,
each role has conflicting information and different
actions they can take, requiring team members to
effectively share information and coordinate actions to
mitigate the unfolding attack. For example, the SCADA
technician can see data about SCADA devices and
choose to investigate or turn off a device, while the
communications manager sees citizen complaints about
the impact of the attack and can choose to notify the
public about a problem. The team’s effectiveness is
determined by both first-order effects on the devices that
are damaged or shut off and second-order effects on city
residents as a result of the attack [43]. The “attribution”
phase requires players to synthesize and reconcile
evidence to determine the source of the cyberattack.
Like the previous collaborative decision-making tasks,
this activity includes similar role-specific information
that can contradict other role’s information, suggesting
the inherent uncertainty of initial attribution attempts.
These design elements emphasize many of the
learning outcomes, scenarios, and design ideas
identified in this paper. We aimed to provide a holistic,
highly contextualized view of a complex, real-world
scenario with different roles and the need to effectively
broker information through the entire attack lifecycle.
We have also embedded many suggestions such as using
a simple risk model, including a debriefing exercise,
presenting contradictory information (e.g., in the
attribution phase), including experts for consultation,
etc. Of course, our take on the simulation is just one of
many - focused largely on those new to cybersecurity.
We are excited to see what other educational designers
develop from the many useful ideas expressed by the
experts whose ideas we have synthesized in this paper.
Although systematically analyzed, our study is not
without limitations. It represents the opinions of 12
individuals, during 8 interview sessions. Fortunately,
it includes interviewees from a range of backgrounds,

who were well aware of attacks on city and public
infrastructures. However, we do note that one third of
the participants were from the academic community and
not practitioners, which could be seen as a limitation.
Additional interviews, including ones with people filling
different cybersecurity professional roles would likely
lead to additional insights. We chose to use a thematic
analysis approach that let the themes emerge from the
data. While we believe this was useful in staying
true to the voice of the experts, it does not connect
as directly to existing cybersecurity frameworks (e.g.,
NIST Framework) as it would have if we had coded
the data into an existing framework. Future work could
expand on this paper by increasing the number and
diversity of interviewees or applying alternative coding
strategies. Our hope is that the learning outcomes
and design ideas shared in this paper will inspire new
educational experiences to help improve the security of
our city and public infrastructures.
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